

**The Conflict in Darfur
And the Peaceful Negotiated
Settlement in Abuja : 5/5/2006**

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I- Basic Facts About Darfur

- **Geographical Location :**

Darfur lies in the farthest western part of Sudan, with an area approximately totaling (196404) miles. To the east it is bordered by the Northern Sate and those of Northern and Western Kordufan, to the south by northern and Western Bahr Al Ghazal States, to the northwest by Libya, to the west by Chad, with Central African Republic bordering it to the southwest.

The Darfur region extends between latitudes (9° 20') north, and longitudes (16° 30') east. Darfur area are slightly bigger than that of Egypt. Its northern part is dominated by poor savanna climate, with its southern part having rich Savanna. Rainfall rates and vegetation cover get less the further we move south. However, Jabal Marrah region with its Mediterranean climate is different. It has the same Mediterranean climate vegetation cover and it known for production of vegetables and fruits.

- **Population Structure and Mode of Living :-**

Based on the last population census conducted in 1993, the Darfur region population totaled (4,746,46), belonging to various tribes such as Al Fur, Bani Halba, Tunjur, Al Barti, al Habaniya, Al Zaqawa, Al Ziyadia, Al Taaysha, Al Falata, Al maidub, al Bargo, Mahrya, Al Muhamid, Al Sulamat, Al Missayaly, Al Gummur, Al irigat, Al Itaifat, Bani Mansur, al Tualba, Druq, Al Silaihab, Al Mima, Al Torjum, Al Marant, al Hawra and Al Tawama.

It was also historically proven that several tribes and groups came to Darfur for economic reasons or for cultural ones such as memorization of the Holy Koran and teaching of learning of the Arabic language. Groups from Central and West Africa which crossed the region on their way home from Pilgrimage also settled in the region and mixed with local tribes hence close-knit social fabric was developed.

Most notably was the migration of large numbers from central Sudan tribes such as Jaalyeen, Shaigya and Dognola to Darfur, to practice trade at Kobi, west of El Fasher, which was an international trade centre where caravans loaded with products left for Egypt across Arbaeen Route, those migrants from central Sudan mixed with other ethnic groups through marriages to give birth to the Darfurians of today.

The various climatic conditions in the region led to diversification of the economic activities. Some groups professed grazing of livestock as a major occupation especially in northern parts of Darfur where rainfall is little. In addition to the variation of natural environment, some traditional values also influenced the mode of living.

The Maidub for instance used to look at farming as a mean profession, contrary to their neighbours, Al Barti, as a result the former professed grazing of camels even during rainy seasons. Other tribes such as Rizigat, Habanya, Taisha and Falata preferred settlement in South Darfur where the natural environment is suitable for livestock raising. Inhabitants of the southern, eastern and western part of that region took farming as a major occupation selling surplus products in local markets to buy livestock which they trusted friends with grazing them.

Because of the drought and desertification which swept over the region during the last two decades, several tribes professed both grazing and farming for survival. Combining these two occupations with one another, because the dominant mode of living, attracted other groups as a result of the drought that hit the region. That combination entailed a flexible system of division of labour. The family young members would graze livestock while elderly would stay on farms, reforming them for cultivation of crops during the autumn season. Despite farming and grazing being the main occupations in the three states of Darfur, some have successfully entered the field of border trade. Generally it can be said that economic activity in Darfur is originally of a subsistence nature as to production and its relations. However, some transformation trends were noted as manifested in gearing production toward exportation to local, regional and international markets.

These new trends mitigated smuggling operations across joint borders with Libya, Chad and Republic Central Africa particularly after the establishment of customs stations to encourage producers.

- **Historical Facts :-**

Historically, the, explorers and the historians believed that the bigger part of Darfur was the home of African tribes. Successive influx of Semite and Hamites migrations from north, east and west followed over various historical epochs. These migrations to the region were motivated by the search for relative political stability and the availability of the natural environment for raising of livestock. These two factors lured some nomadic tribes particularly Arab tribes to migrate from North Africa to Darfur. These

migrations marked the beginning of cross-fertilization between African and Arab cultures in the region.

- **Relations with Neighboring Countries and their Impact on Darfur:-**

As earlier noted by historians, Darfur was the scene of migrations by several African tribes who came over to the area within various historical epochs. It has also been proved that these tribes have some ethnic roots in neighbouring countries. As a result of the open borders between Sudan and its neighbours, the migrant tribes racially mixed with others across the borders and a cultural, social and possibly a political reality has developed in the process. A look at Sudan political map today would tell how Sudan is bordered by Arab and African countries, borders that were delineated by colonialists to serve their vested interests. These borders resulted in the distribution of tribal entities over African countries without considering their interests. Consequently some of these entities found themselves within Sudanese territories, with their clans in neighbouring countries.

According to a number of historians, a considerable number of Darfurians and others concerned with its affairs believe that the external factor is one of the causes to blame for conflicts and tribal wars in Darfur. That was clearly evident in the Chadian-Libyan conflict, the Chadian-Chadian conflict following the overthrow of Tamblby regime and the ascendancy of Farolina front to power and the conflicts that broke between rebels and the new government which left their effects on Darfur. In fact, Darfur was turned into a battlefield, with warring factions and foreign forces using it as a harbour and a hiding place.

To sum it up the root-cause of conflict in Darfur were fanned by geographical and historical factors, in addition to the multiethnic structure of this population that contributed to conflicts over resources. Bitterness resulting from these conflicts bred semi permanent hostilities.

Across the borders interrelationship between tribes were yet another factor of conflicts triggered by imperialistic forces to protect their control of the continent tapped and untapped resources.

- **Root Causes of the Conflict in Darfur :-**

The root-causes of the Darfur conflict are closely inter-related. As a result that conflict should be examined in the light of the geographical location, the historical factor and population structure. The behaviour and

mode of living, in addition to neighbourly relations and their impact on the area.

The salient features of conflict can be seen in the following :-

First : Conflict over resources

Second : Conflict between farmers and nomads

Third : Tribal conflicts and retaliations ensuing there-from.

Fourth : Conflict against outlaws “armed robbery gangs”.

Fifth : Negative impact of political conflict on Darfur.

Sixth : International conflict over Darfur and its effects on the internal one.

- **Patterns of Conflict in Darfur :-**

As mentioned earlier, spread of illegal position of arms in Darfur has largely contributed to the complexity of the crisis and its current associations. That reason in particular intensified the conflict; to culminate in a rebellion led by the two groups that transgressed the authority and legitimacy of the state.

The flow of arms into Darfur has cultural roots. Since human communities have certain cultures characterizing them, the people of Darfur have been known for carrying of white arms (knives, swords, arrows) whenever they left their homes. This tradition relates to the primitiveness of the community and the historical background of tribal wars and tribal and raids, in addition to punitive raids launched by chieftains on recalcitrant tribes. This reality produced what has been known as “war of traditions” and reliance on the tribe for protection.

- **Sources of Arms Trafficking to Darfur :-**

- 1- Ethiopian arms during the regime of the Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam,
- 2- Arms originating from Libya and the southern Sudan States adjacent to Darfur such as the State of Northern and Western Bahr Al Ghazal
- 3- The Chadian-Chadian and the Libyan-Chadian war that resulted in some fighters taking refuge in desert areas of Northern Darfur, hence selling arms to tribes at low prices.
- 4- Arms distributed to native administration guard were discovered to have been used in tribal conflicts.
- 5- Some arms in the custody of governmental units are sometimes smuggled in the event of eruption of conflict as happened in the

case of Dhain events where one of the parties to the conflict had access to arms stored by the armed forces.

- 6- Some believe that remnants of arms used by the National Front forces that attempted to attack the regime of former President Nimeiri in 1976 had reached some warriors.

- **Major Areas of Conflict :-**

- * **First : Conflict Over Resources :-**

Variation of environmental and climatic conditions drove some Darfurian tribes living in the northern part of that region to engage in grazing as a main occupation. Since rainfall in this part is little, these tribes often found themselves forced to look for grazing areas especially after the region was hit with drought and desertification. That in turn led to conflicts among settled and nomadic tribes. Indeed, the conflict between nomads and farmers over resources was the major root-cause of what came to be known as the tribal conflict.

Little rainfall in the region, coupled with scarcity of water resources led nomads to depend on valleys and surface water pools, in addition to wells whose depths ranges between (10 – 30 meters).

It is worth mentioning that the rainy season begins in July and lasts through mid January, to be followed by movement in search of water resources, with the occurrence of clashes over them likely to happen and to later develop into a tribal conflict.

- * **Secondly : Conflict Between Farmers and Nomads :-**

As we have concluded earlier, grazing areas in northern and western parts of Darfur were impoverished over the last three decades as a result of the climate and environmental conditions that swept over Darfur. Tribal conflicts sparked by clashes between farmers and nomads over the livestock routes are among the major causes of conflict in Darfur.

To quote the report prepared in 1980 by the Committee of Natural Resources “Grazing activity in Darfur ranks second to farming as an economic resource, with livestock totaling 80%”. Nomads routes are hampered by :

- 1- Grazing outside permitted areas.
- 2- Establishment of fences with the aim of preventing livestock from having access to fodder.
- 3- Random farming in quest of a more fertile soil.

- 4- Fire-lines for land cultivation to prepare for the agricultural season. These fires were recently used to drive away livestock from cultivated farms.

*** Thirdly : Conflict Between Tribes and Other Ethnic Groups :-**

Flow of arms in Darfur, as we have detailed, persuaded inhabitants to have access to them for purposes of self-defense, that of property or for launching of raids on other tribes in the event of conflicts. Armed robbery in particular has increasingly grown over that last three decades. Causes that flared conflicts among the Darfur tribes can be classified into the two following categories:

*** Direct Causes :-**

- 1- Clashes over grazing areas and nomads' routes.
- 2- ownership of land was divided by the British colonists to enforce the policy of "divided and rule". Some tribal areas were provided with services and others were deliberately overlooked.
- 3- Armed robbery flared sedition among tribes, with each tribe coming out in defense of its embers when hunted down by the tribe whose members were robbed.
- 4- Spread of illegal possession of arms and their use in tribal conflicts.
- 5- Blind tribal loyalty resulting from illiteracy. Loyalty to the tribe in Darfur comes before that to the nation or even to greater Darfur.
- 6- Foreign vested interests as manifested in USA and Britain having their eyes on the abundant underground wealth in the region, and with France eyes on Chad oil wealth, with signals of conflict between her and USA emerging. The copper rich area adjacent to Central African has led foreign powers to fan conflict in Darfur to have a foothold in the region.
- 7- War in southern Sudan and its extension to other contact regions culminated in the flow of arms into Darfur, particularly from neighboring Bahr El Ghazal.

*** Indirect Causes :-**

- 1- Absence of balanced development: Throughout the post-independence era, development in Darfur was not adequately attended to. However, the incumbent regime has adopted a new development policy in the region to lift it from that historical legacy.

- 2- Successive national governments were unable to establish their authority in the region due to its extensive area and rough landscape.
- 3- Administrative limitation due to failure of public service to meet the region's needs for administrative cadres. Abolishing of the native administration, which was vested with administrative, Judiciary and police powers was another limitation. Apart from shortening the state administrative shadow, native administration used to settle disputes among the regions inhabitants.
- 4- Sudan's big area entailed the adoption of a decentralized system capable of providing citizens with basic services, which centralized national governments, failed to cater to. May regime took a commendable step by introducing regional autonomy though the system was defective. Equally commendable was the adoption of the Federal system by the incumbent government. As a result Darfur has been divided into three states namely, north, South, and West Darfur states. A merit of that system was the shortening of the administrative shadow, allowing each state to choose its representatives on the legislative bodies at federal, state and local levels. The state governors, commissioners and ministers were also picked up from among the people of the state. But that new division has some negative aspects such as some ethnic groups losing their geographical and administrative regions due to the establishment of new states, provinces, and localities. Another negative aspect was the revival of ethnic, regional and tribal drives to the detriment of affiliation to the nation at large.

Influence of migration from the northern to the southern part of Darfur that lasted till the division of Darfur into three states gave birth to some problems that took a hidden dimension resistant to these migrations. Following application of the federal system, movement of tribes in pursuit of water and resources triggered another cause of tribal conflicts.

- **Chronology of Tribal conflicts in Darfur :-**

First : Conflict between Zagawa and Rizigat during the sixties of the outgoing century.

Second : Conflict between Maalya and Rizigat during the sixties of the outgoing century.

Third : Conflict between Taisha and Salamat, southern Darfur during the eighties of the outgoing century.

Fourth : Fur-Arabs conflict in Jabal Marra, 1978 – 1989

Fifth : Zagawa-Rizigat, Northern Darfur, 1994

Sixth : Arab-Massaleet, Western Darfur, 1994

Seventh : Rizigat-Zagawa, South Darfur, 1997 – 1999

Eighth : Maidob-Kabaish

Ninth : Zaqawa-al Gimir, West Darfur, 1999

Tenth : Arabs-Massalit, Western Darfur – 1999

Eleventh : Fur-Arab conflict at Jabal Marra, 2002

Twelfth : Maalya-Rizigat, South Darfur, 2002

Thirteenth : Arabs-Massalit, West Darfur, 2003

It is regrettable that recommendations of reconciliation conferences that followed these conflicts, sponsored by the states were short-lived. Perhaps one of the most serious effects of those conflicts was the emergence of tribal alliances, directed against other tribes.

A case in point was Zagawa and Massalit allying against Arab tribes, Fur and Massalit against Arab tribes, Arab and Chad Arab tribes against Fur and Massalit and Chadian opposition and Massalit against Arab tribes, and Arab tribe in Northern Darfur.

*** Fourthly : Conflict Against Armed Gangs:**

Armed robbery in Darfur dates back to some decades. The state of turmoil that prevailed on at the Chadian border region of Ozo and the Libyan-Sudanese conflict during the regime of the Sudanese former President Nimeiri, culminated in the flow of different kinds of arms in Darfur, and this in turn gave rise to the phenomenon of armed robbery that came to be known as “Janjaweed” phenomena

According to the proceedings of the Nyala Criminal Court, armed robbery in Darfur was seen as an organized crime, when in 1987, armed robbers were caught equipped with highly sophisticated communication devices, using deadly weapons.

That organized crime developed to adopt tactics such as following the victims as was evident in armed gangs stopping a passenger bus and calling one of the passengers by name ordering him to give them the amount of money cashed for him by the Nyala Unity Bank. Upon refusal, they severely beat him. What are the causes of armed robbery?

Studies made on the phenomena revealed that the causes could be as follows :

- a- The desire to amass fortune within a short period especially that robbers do not possess the qualifications that enable them to acquire money through decent means.
- b- Arrested suspects drive to average themselves on regular forces after their acquittal.
- c- Inability of authorities to hunt down criminals.
- d- The traditional cultural folklore that hails armed robbery, likening it to a brave act.

II- Developments of the War in Darfur

The escalation of the war in Darfur that began in February 2003 is markedly different from all the wars which had hitherto been fought in the region. Two armed groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and later the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched attacks on policemen, government garrisons and civilians in the area. While the first widely acknowledged attack was on Gulu, the capital of the Jebel Marra region of central Darfur, there had been attacks on government forces and civilians for several months prior to that. One of the first attacks was on an army post between Nyala and Tur in early 2002. The rebel groups appear to have been drawn from within "African" sedentary communities such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit. In October 2002, what would subsequently become the SLA elected a leadership which allocated the three top positions along tribal lines. Abde al-Wahid al-Nur, a Fur, became chairman; Abdalla Abakkar, a Zaghawa, became chief-of-staff; and the deputy-chairmanship was allocated to a Massaleit, Mansour Arabab, when Abdalla Abakar subsequently died in the fighting, another Zaghawa, Minni Arkou Mianwi, replaced him, the secretary-general of the SLA. Mansour Arabab was also later replaced by Khamees Abdallah. The Justice and Equality Movement was publicly launched in 2001 and led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, a long-time associate of Dr. Hasan Turaboi, JEM is closely identified with the Zaghawa tribe.

A number of systematic and well-organized attacks, most notably on al-Fasher and Mellit, respectively the capital and the second largest city in North Darfur, followed on from the Gulu attack. The attack on al-Fasher was

carried by hundreds of rebels, in dozens of vehicles, and there were significant military and civilian casualties. In that attack the rebels murdered 200 army prisoners after they had surrendered. The rebel forces are said to be “well equipped”. The SLA was reported by Agency France Press to have “modern satellite communications”. UN media sources have also noted claims by tribal leaders that the rebels have better weapons than the Sudanese army. The rebels have also been receiving military supplies by air. The fighters, led by commanders with satellite telephones, are well-armed with rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine-guns, mortars and automatic rifles, and transported in fleets of vehicles – mainly Toyota, with mounted heavy machine guns. The rebels have killed over 685 policemen, wounded 500 others and attacked and destroyed over 80 police stations. It is worth noting that most of the policemen killed or wounded were from tribes of African origin.

In response to these attacks, government forces launched military offensives against the SLA. These resulted in the death of the SLA military commander, Abdallah Abakkar, and the recovery of most of the areas previously held by the rebels. The communities from which the rebels had recruited their fighters bore the brunt of much of the fighting.

The systematic murder by rebels of several hundred policemen and the destruction of over 80 police stations created a security vacuum, specially in rural areas. The rebels’ targeting of tribal leaders and tribesmen from several “Arab” tribes, and the theft of thousands of head of livestock from these tribes, have resulted in an explosion of inter-communal violence with revenge attacks and livestock raids by equally well-armed nomadic tribe. Darfur has also historically had a serious problem with armed banditry, the so-called “Janjaweed” phenomena, and heavily armed criminal gangs from both sides of the Chad-Sudan border have added to the chaos.

Rebel attacks on development projects continued into 2004. In June 2004, for example, rebel attacks stopped work on an emergency water supply project for al-Fasher. Their attacks on development and infrastructure projects have been criticized by several Darfurian community leaders. The chairman of trade unions in North Darfur, Alamir Altagani Ali Dinar, stated that it was “strange” that the rebels attacked the development projects in the state, while claiming lack of development as the cause of their movement. By May 2005, in the state of North Darfur alone, all health facilities had been destroyed or affected by the war. Almost 40% of dispensaries and 80% of the wells in the state had also been destroyed or damaged.

In this regard, it is essential to shed light on the government's development record in Darfur since the present government that came to power in 1989. The government has stated that, before 1989, there were only 16 high schools in Darfur: there are presently some 250 schools; the number of primary schools had increased from 241 in 1986 to 786 in 2003. In 1989 there were 27,000 students in schools; in 2003 there were more than 440,000. In 1989 there was not a single university in Darfur; there are now three. The number of hospitals in Darfur has increased under this government from three hospitals in 1988 to 23 hospitals by 2001; health centres had increased from 2044 in the same period. Water pump production in greater Darfur has also increased from 1,200,00 cubic metres in 1989 to 3,100,000 cubic meters in 2003. During 2000-2003, the following water projects were implemented in greater Darfur: the installation of 110 deep ground wells, the rehabilitation of 133 ground wells, the building of 43 dykes and 30 dams, the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation of 839 hand pump wells. The total power generation greater Darfur has risen under this government from 2,300 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kw by 2000. Before 1989 there was not a single airport in Darfur; there are now three, in al-Fasher, Nyala and al-Geneina, along with three aerodromes at al-Deain, Zallingi and Jama – this represents 40 per cent of airports outside of the national capital. There has been a three-fold increase in paved roads since 1989. And, politically, Darfur is very well represented at all levels of Sudanese society. As of early 2005 there were eight government ministers from Darfur and four Darfurian state governors. Darfurians are also members of the supreme and constitutional courts. Darfurian representation in the National Assembly is second only to the southern states. (Annex 1)

The Sudanese government has also made the point that, far from showing interest in development issues for Darfur, rebels' have repeatedly attacked key education and development projects and civilians involved in these projects. In April 2003, rebels murdered Engineer Ahmed Youssef Mahdi, the director of the Jebel Marra agricultural scheme. On 21 November 2003, for example, rebels murdered al-Tayeb Abdul Gadir al-Nour, a telephone engineer, while he was inspecting the fiberglass cable line linking Nyala and al-Geneina. On 27 November that year they murdered three water engineers working on rural water schemes. In March 2003 rebels attacked the school examination centre in Tina and stole the examination papers. This led to the abandoning of certain school examinations nationally, adversely affecting tens of thousands of school students and their families.

III- The Darfur Peace Process

The peace process that has unfolded over the past three years has, however, been a difficult one. The Government has repeatedly declared its commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis. On the eve of signing the historic January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending Sudan's long-running north-south conflict, President Bashir reiterated his commitment to attaining a settlement of the war in Darfur. The new government of national unity in Sudan, formed in September 2005 and bringing together Sudan's former north-south combatants, restated its commitment to peace talks. The government announced in January 2005 that Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the man who negotiated an end to the long-running war in the south, would be focusing on the Darfur crisis. Vice-President Taha has stated that the conflict should be easier to resolve than the north-south war. The government has also involved northern opposition parties, including the National Democratic Alliance, in the search for peace.

Sudan has welcomed the close involvement of both the African Union and Chad as mediators, and has also agreed and urged the deployment of thousands of African Union peace-keeping forces. The African Union has committed itself to attaining peace in Darfur. In January 2005, the chairman of the African Union, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, stated: "I want to give you one assurance on behalf of Nigeria and the AU. We will not rest until there is peace and perfect peace in Darfur and in the whole of Sudan".

- **Abeche Agreement (17/9/2003) :-**

In 2003, the Chadian government, parts of which are drawn from the Zaghawa tribe. Offered to mediate between the government and rebels. The Sudanese government welcomed and has continued to welcome ongoing Chadian mediation in the conflict. The government of Chad was instrumental in negotiation ceasefires in western Sudan in September 2003 and earlier. It has been a challenging task. On 3 September 2003, however, as the result of indirect talks hosted by President Deby, the Sudanese government and rebels signed a six-week ceasefire in Abeche, Chad. On 17 September, the government and the SLA signed an agreement allowing "free and unimpeded" humanitarian access within Darfur. The Government and rebels agree to a tripartite ceasefire monitoring commission made up of five members from both sides and five Chadian military officials. In subsequent

Chadian-brokered peace talks, the rebels proved to be intransigent. Chadian Government mediators declared in December 2003, for example, that the rebels had stalled peace talks: “There has been a breakdown in negotiations because of unacceptable rebel demands. The talks have been suspended: it’s a failure”. Chad’s President called rebel demands “unacceptable”. In what was seen as a deliberate attempt to derail the peace talks, the SLA demanded military control of the region during transitional period, 13 percent of all Sudan’s oil earnings and SLA autonomy in administering Darfur.

- **The N’djamenan Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict (8/4/2004) :-**

On 8 April 2004, in Ndjamena, the Government of Sudan and both rebel movement signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur. Under the Ceasefire Agreement, the parties agreed, amongst other things, to: cease hostilities and proclaim a cease-fire for a period of 45 days automatically renewable, unless opposed by one of the parties; establish a Joint commission and a Ceasefire Commission, with the participation of the international community, including the African Union: free all prisoners of war and all other persons detained because of the armed conflict in Darfur; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency relief to the displaced persons and other civilians victims of war, in accordance with the Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, referred to above. The parties also agreed to: combine their efforts in order to establish a global and definite peace in Darfur; meet at a later stage within the framework of a conference of all the representatives of Darfur to agree on a global definite settlement of the problems of their region, especially concerning its socio-economic development: contribute to create an environment conducive to negotiation and stop hostile media campaigns.

Sudan welcomed the decision by the African Union to send monitoring teams to follow up implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the government and the armed groups in Darfur. The AU Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Namibia have agreed to send military officers to be deployed as observers in Darfur. They will be on the ground as soon as possible.

Almost immediately, SLA spokesmen stated that they would not honour the ceasefire and would not attend peace talks aimed at establishing the envisaged joint ceasefire monitoring commission. Later SLM/A spokesman

Musa Haid Al-Doa said the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would not go to the peace talks and would not abide by a ceasefire in effect since last week. Two days later counter statements were made by other leading SLA figures. Analysts say there is infighting in the SLM/A's leadership with a power struggle between prominent figures in the armed and political wings.

It was evident that confusion reigned among the rebels at the political talks in the April (2004), with the two groups eventually repudiating the deal their delegations accepted. The mixed signals are indicative of serious infighting between the military and political wing. The SLA sought to settle some of these differences in prolonged consultations between its chairman, Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour, and its military coordinator, Minni Arkou Minawi. JEM, reflecting the strong position of its political leader, Khalil Ibrahim, took a different approach, firing dissident commanders and political cadres deemed disloyal. In April 2004, for example, Khalil Ibrahim dismissed the movement's second-in-command, Jibril Abdel Karim Bare.

The two rebel groups have rejected government proposals for round table conferences on Darfur – despite having agreed on 8th April 2004 to attend a peace and development conference in Khartoum for all Darfur leaders, including the rebels, to be chaired by Idriss Deby, the Chadian president. A 130-strong preparatory committee were planning for some 1,700 delegates. The JEM leaders stated : “We will not participate in this conference nor do we recognize it”.

In late April 2004 the rebels declared once again they would not participate in the ceasefire talks in Addis Ababa or the political negotiations in N'djamena. Reuters reported that Darfur rebels were unlikely to attend peace talks to end the fighting in Darfur. The SLA had said “it would not attend the political talks due to reconvene on April 24 in Chad, adding it wanted Eritrea to mediate instead of (Chadian) President Idriss Deby. Reuters noted that “Sudan has poor relations with Eritrea”. Reuters also quoted JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim : “I don't think we are going to Chad. The Chadian President should not chair any meeting nor any of his executives. Even the United States warned the rebels against boycotting the talks aimed at creating a commission to monitor the Darfur ceasefire. A State Department spokesperson stated : “The United States expects the parties ... to actively engage in the planning and implementation of the ceasefire monitoring team. Failure of any party to fully participate in this crucial part of the ceasefire agreement is a clear statement of bad faith and will affect our relationship with them.

In early May 2004 Chadian peace mediators reported that the government had complained at rebel violations of the ceasefire, citing government claims that “The rebels are looting and threatening civilians”. The complaint also accused rebels of livestock rustling, a particularly provocative action in western Sudan. By late May 2004, the Government stated that there had been 26 rebel violations of the cease-fire in West Darfur alone. On 24 May the governor of South Darfur state said that there had been several rebel attacks on villages and civilians. He cited attacks on Abgaragil village, 50 kilometres south of the state capital of Nyala.

To work out logistical details for the ceasefire monitoring commission, the AU sent a reconnaissance mission to Darfur and Chad, from 7 to 13 May 2004. It was made up of representatives from the UN, EU, US and France. On 22 May, the SLA rejected AU proposals to meet with the government and finalize the formation of a ceasefire commission, claiming that Ethiopia was too closely aligned to the Sudanese government.

The eventual establishment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as part of the ceasefire protocol is of critical importance to efforts to end the crisis. AMIS is chaired by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe. There are also two deputy special representatives, one based in Khartoum one in al-Fashir. The Deputy SRRC in al-Fashir normally chairs the Ceasefire Commission. AMIS was authorized by a meeting on 25 May 2004 of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council. This meeting sanctioned the deployment of an AU observer mission and a protection force to support the work of the ceasefire commission.

- **N’djamena Agreement on the Modalities of CFC (28/5/2004) :-**

On 28 May the government and rebels signed an Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the CFC and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur, creating a joint ceasefire commission along with arrangements for international observers. The Ceasefire Commission was to be chaired by the AU, the international community (represented by the European Union) as the deputy chairman, Chadian mediators, the Government of Sudan, JEM and SLA. The CFC reports to the Joint Commission, which is made up of two senior members each from the Parties, the Chadian government, the AU, USA and EU. The operational arm of the CFC is the AU Monitoring Mission, made up of observers from the Parties, Chad, AU member states and other members of the International

Community on 4 June, the African Union and other international observers finalized an agreement with the government setting out the terms of the ceasefire observer mission agreed in the April ceasefire protocol. The agreement set out the relationship between Khartoum and the ceasefire committee in Darfur and which gives the observers free entry into Sudan and free movement inside the country. In total, an initial group of 120 observers from the AU, the European Union, the United States, the Sudanese government, the two rebel groups in Darfur and the mediation team from neighbouring Chad was to be deployed in the region. On 9 June 2004, the African Union established a headquarters in al-Fasher from which to monitor the ceasefire, and from which to deploy these military observers. The CFC became fully operational on 19 June.

An AU meeting held on 20 October 2004 decided to strengthen AMIS with a renewable one year period with the following mandate: to monitor and observe compliance with the humanitarian ceasefire agreement; to assist in confidence building between the Parties; and to contribute a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDPs and refugees. An AMIS strength of 6,171 military personnel and some 1,560 civilian police personnel was agreed. AMIS units were drawn from Nigerian, Rwandan, Senegalese, Cambian, Chadian, Kenyan and South African soldiers.

- **Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur**

- Addis Ababa (15/7/2004)**

In early July 2004, both the SLA and JEM stated that they would not attend further peace talks in Chad. A SLA leaders said “We do not want Chad to mediate for the political issues because they were not fair in the humanitarian talks”. The president of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konare, announced that the first round of AU-mediated political negotiations between the warring parties to try to end the crisis were to begin in mid-July in Addis Ababa: “The problem with Darfur is political, its solution is political, hence the necessity for the parties to quickly begin political negotiations on July 15 in Addis Ababa. We hope that all the parties are properly represented”. The Justice and Equality Movement declared, however, that it would not be joining political negotiations in the Addis Ababa aimed at ending the crisis: “These negotiations are coming too quickly”. AU officials who struggled for three days to convene a rebel-government meeting said their task had never looked very promising because

Darfur's top rebel leaders had chosen instead to attend a Sudanese opposition conference held in Eritrea.

Meanwhile rebel attacks on humanitarian aid personnel continued. In the first week of July 2004, the SLA attacked 26 aid workers, working for Save the Children UK, delivering emergency assistance in northern Darfur. They also stole six vehicles. On 13 July, the British government urged Sudanese rebels to return the stolen vehicles. Rebels also attacked a relief convoy near Orishi in North Darfur, murdering nine civilians and several policemen. They also attacked another aid convoy north of al-Fasher, killing four truck drivers.

- **The Abuja Peace Talks :-**

- **Abuja 2nd Round of Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks**

The second round of African Union-sponsored inter-Sudanese peace talks was held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 23 August to 17 September 2004. The government declared: "Our concern is to find a quick peaceful solution to all the unresolved questions". The Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, hailed the adoption by both sides of a broad agenda of humanitarian, security and political issues as a "first step in the right direction". The negotiations were almost immediately deadlocked when the Darfur rebel groups backtracked on the previously agreed agenda. Abd al-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army, stated: "We in the movement reject this agenda completely". The rebels' move was described by mediators as a "blow to the African Union". The leader of the Sudanese government delegation, reiterated that "We adopted this agenda in front of President Obasanjo and AU and Un representatives this morning, and we are good to our word. We are very keen to continue these negotiations". The agenda, made up of the following items – humanitarian issues, security issues, political issues and socio-economic issues – was eventually agreed. On day three of the talks, the Sudanese government agreed to accept a larger African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur if the troops were used to contain and demobilize rebel forces. The African Union had suggested the supervised cantonment of rebel and government forces as a step towards a peaceful solution to the crisis. Rebel leaders subsequently refused to discuss the issue of cantonment. The JEM spokesman stated: "WE insist that this point be taken off the agenda".

Rebel intransigence was being increasingly noted. The New York Times observed in late 2004: "In recent months, the SLA has repeatedly

stalled peace talks being brokered by the African Union by setting unrealistic preconditions or quibbling over such details as where the talks should be held; for its part the Justice and Equality Movement faction had, until recently, boycotted the talks altogether”. Anderson cited an American diplomat: “The first notion anyone’s got to disabuse themselves of is that there are any good guys in this. There aren’t. S.L.A. started this war, and now they and Justice and Equality Movement are doing everything possible to keep it doing.

In August 2004, American journalist Sam Dealey pointed to possible reasons for apparent rebel indifference to peace talks: “The international community may wish to restrain from setting early deadlines for intervention. Such deadlines only encourage rebel intransigence in pursuing peace deals. As last month’s unsuccessful talks in Ethiopia proved. With outside action threatened, there is little incentive for the rebels to negotiate a lasting cease-fire.

*** The Protocol on the Improvement of Humanitarian Situation in Darfur :-**

The talks nevertheless ended with the agreeing of a Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur which addressed the issue of free movement and access for humanitarian workers and assistance as well as the protection of civilians. Sudan agreed to the deployment of more than 3,000 AU peacekeeping troops in Darfur. The parties also agreed the establishment of a Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit – based in al-Fasher – to ensure a more effective monitoring of the commitments they had entered into. It was also agreed to request the UN High Commission for Human Rights to expand the number of its human rights monitors in Darfur.

In the lead-up to the next rounds of talks the rebels intensified their attacks in Darfur, attacks which severely impeded the delivery of emergency aid to Darfur. In October 2004, the UN confirmed rebel responsibility for attacks in Darfur, quoting the UN’s Envoy to Sudan, Mr. Pronk who said rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – were responsible for much of the recent violence, which is restricting humanitarian access to many areas within Darfur, a vast and desolate region in western Sudan.

- **Abuja 3rd Round of Talks :-**

The third round of African Union-mediated Darfur peace talks was held in Abuja from 21 October to 9 November 2004. Despite the urgent and immediate ongoing humanitarian crisis, the rebels refused to discuss the humanitarian issue. JEM spokesman said: “The government is insisting on discussing the humanitarian issue. It only wants to waste time and avoid the real issue on ground”. The rebels also stalled the peace talks because of the African Union’s seating plans, stating they did not wish to sit near the government negotiators. Abubakr Hamid,, the coordinator of the join JEM/SLA team, declared: “We are not going to participate because they are trying to force us to sit with government delegates”. He added: “We’d rather prefer that the African Union appoints two separate teams to negotiate with the two groups.

After considerable time invested in mediation, this round of talks resulted in the signing of a Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur and the signing of the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, as discussed and agreed at the previous round of talks on 9 November 2004, the government and rebels agreed to renew a cessation of hostilities and, for the first time, the government agreed to renounce “hostile” military flights over Darfur, except in cases of self-defence. The two sides had also initiated discussion on a draft Declaration on Principles which would constitute the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the conflict.

- * **The SLA’s November 2004 Violation of the Peace Accords :-**

Despite having signed the Abuja ceasefire protocols on 9 November, less than two weeks later the SLA mounted several systematic attacks on police and civilians in Darfur. The African Union noted that “in late November, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) carried out attacks on various places, including Tawila, in North Darfur, Adwah village, in South Darfur, the twon of Um-Asal and at Draidia. These attacks constitute serious and unacceptable violations of the...N’djamena Agreement and the Abuja protocols”. The rebels coordinated attacks on, amongst other targets, Tawila in North Darfur and Kalma in South Darfur. On 22 November 2004, some 80-100 rebels attacked the police station on the edge of the Kalma DIP camp in South Darfur. This resulted in the death of four policemen, and the wounding of several others. The WFP confirmed the attack and stated that “ominously, the attack appeared to have been launched from inside Kalma

camp”. The UN Envoy to Sudan condemned in the strongest terms the killing of policemen and civilians around Kalma camp. In a separate attack, coordinated to start at the same time as the assault on Kalma, several hundred SLA rebels, traveling in land-cruisers and lorries, attacked Tawila, killing a doctor, 22 policemen and several civilians, and by their actions, forcing the evacuation of aid workers from the surrounding refugee camps.

The government noted that the Tawila and Kalma attacks had brought the number of rebel violations since the signing of the Abuja ceasefire protocol to 19: 12 in South Darfur, six in North Darfur and one in West Darfur and consider this a very serious escalation and constituted a very alarming index of the rebel attitude. The attacks had disrupted a period of relative peace which was also confirmed by the African Union’s own ceasefire monitoring commission. In its October 2004 report, for example, the ceasefire commission noted that there was a “relative calm”. The British aid agency Oxfam confirmed that there had been “improving humanitarian access” but that the attacks had reversed any gains that had been made: “Humanitarian access is worse than it was 6 months ago”.

International criticism of these attacks was universal, immediate and unambiguous. The UN Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk stated that the SLA was solely responsible for breaching the ceasefire and restarting the fighting in north Darfur: “This was unilateral violation of the agreement by SLA, not by the government”. He declared that: “I do really think that the international community should hold them (SLA) accountable for not complying with international agreements and their own promises”. The rebel attacks were also condemned by the American government. The State Department said: “The latest incidents of violence were instigated by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, and they have resulted in the suspension of humanitarian activities in the areas of fighting”. Chris Mullins, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, noted that: “The recent difficulties have been caused by a series of violations predominately initiated by the rebels”. He cited the finding by the UN Envoy to Sudan that “the rebels have been the principle cause in the last two months of incidents that have caused the breakdown of the ceasefire...” His views were echoed by the British international development minister, Hilary Benn: “Recent rebel attacks on Tawila and on humanitarian convoys in Darfur, along with the murder of two Save the Children UK staff are particularly horrific”.

Three days after the attack, the Sudanese government called for the rebels to honour their commitments and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis.

The government also called for the return of the aid workers who had been evacuated as a result of the attacks.

In early December 2004, the SLA admitted kidnappings, attacks on civilians and obstructing aid workers. The organization promised there would be no more incidents. On 5 December 2004, the Sudanese government released documents which it said showed that the rebels had killed 89h people in more than 300 armed robberies since the April 204 ceasefire. The Sudanese interior minister stated that the number of armed robberies in Darfur in eight months following the ceasefire was higher than in the previous 15 month. The documents indicated that from 1 January 2003 to April 2004 there were 251 armed robberies in which 80 people had been murdered. From April until the end of November there were 320 armed robberies during which 89 people were killed.

- **Abuja Fourth Round of Talks :-**

Under pressure from the International Community, the rebels came back to the peace table. The fourth round of Africa Union-mediated Darfur Peace Talks was held in Abuja from 11 to 21 December 2004. The government indicated its wish to reach a peace deal in the African Union talks which had recommended in Abuja. GOS head of delegation said there was “a lot of common ground for agreement”. He said : “We are very much hoping to come to a final peace agreement in this round” adding that the government would do its best to reach an agreement “before the end of this year so that peace in Sudan will be finalized by January in all parts of Sudan”. JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim dismissed the meeting, declaring “this is not a serious round of talks” and that JEM had lost faith in African Union sponsorship of Darfur peace efforts.

The rebels returned to the AU-mediated talks and progress was made during these negotiations. The government agreed to withdraw its forces from positions it had moved into following the rebels’ November offensive in Tawila and elsewhere. And while the rebels rejected new proposals for peace, they promised no more attacks and violations of the ceasefire agreements. The SLA and JEM committed themselves “to cease all attacks against humanitarian and commercial activities and to restrain their forces from attacks on government infrastructure, including police posts”.

The rebels broke their word within days with two serious attacks. On 27 December, rebel forces attacked the town of Ghubaysh. The United National said that “notably” this was “the second attack by the SLA since 19

December when the Government of Sudan agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities”.

In late December JEM had refused any continuing African Union mediation in the Darfur conflict, citing a rebel spokesman: “JEM is rejecting the African Union. We are not going to Abuja again under the auspices of the African Union.”. this was a particular blow to the peace process as the future rounds of peace talks were to focus on the political solution to the Darfur conflict. The government had already announced a range of proposals focusing on a federal solution to the problem”.

The Sudanese government showed its frustration at the unwillingness of the Darfur rebels to seriously commit to the peace talks: “At the last round in Abuja where the vital political issues was to be discussed, (the)government came ready with six ministers. That shows we were here for business. But the rebels had a different agenda. They delegated very junior officers who could not agree on anything. It is no wonder that (they) keep frustrating the talks via incessant walkouts. The GOS spokesman said:

In nearly January 2005 the rebels announced that they would be leaving the ceasefire commission in Darufr. Unconsidered of that the rebel threat to withdraw from a cease-fire monitoring commission in Sudan’s troubled Darfur region would spell disaster for the faltering peace process.

On 13 January 2005, the Sudanese government urged the complete deployment of the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. The United Nations has repeatedly noted the government’s commitment to a peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict. In his February 2005 comments to the United Nations Security Council meeting on Sudan, the Un Envoy to Sudan, Mr. Jan Pronk, stated: “The good news is that the government has shown a willingness to negotiate, toughly, but seriously, on the basis of principles concerning the sharing of power and wealth that have resulted in the Naivasha peace agreement. The Government has recently confirmed its commitment to such talks. President Bashir and Vice President Taha have made it quite clear: the objective is peace through negotiations, in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.

By contrast, the Un Secretary-General’s February 2005 assessment of the preceding six-month period with regard to the rebel movements was bleak: “Over this period, the rebel movements have become less cooperative in talks. Their attacks on police have increased and often seemed intended to invite retaliation”. In a further complication, tensions between SLA military commanders and the exiled political leadership resurfaced in early 2005. the

military leadership were reported to have distanced themselves from the SLA chairman Abd al-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur and the Secretary-General Mnni Arkou Minawi.

In March 2005 the UN reported that the SLA had been involved in “number of attacks against civilians”, including attacks on Haraza and Wazazen villages in South Darfur. JEM was also reported to have attacked the village of Rahad El Fate. The UN Secretary-General also commented upon “the rash of attacks during March on international personnel operating in Darfur”.

There were clashes between the Government and rebel movements throughout April 2005. the UN’s report for April noted t hat “in most cases, Government forces were on the defensive as the rebel movements conducted small-scale attacks against Government convoys or small units of army or police personnel, of the two (rebel) movements, it appeared that SLA was more often the instigator of the clashes...Not only were the rebel movements more active militarily against Government forces, but both SLA and JEM attacked villages and other civilian targets.

The United Nations reported that: “The Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) carried out a number of attacks on police and militia in April and continue to take commercial, private and non-governmental organization vehicles at gunpoint on a scale that suggests that these acts approved by their leadership. There are reliable reports that the vehicles are taken with the aim of converting tem into battlefield platforms. Abductions, theft of livestock, restrictions on freedom of movement and general intimidation of civilians and humanitarian workers, including United Nations personnel, by rebel movement, were reported throughout April”. In late May 2005 an 80-strong rebel force attacked the village of Amo, near Kutum in North Darufr. They wounded several civilians, killed 50 camels and stole several thousand more.

The UN noted that “banditry continued to plague Darfur. In May, the Secretary-General also reported that “those criminal acts are increasingly being committed by rebel and militia fighters, in addition to common criminals acting without a political agenda. Banditry threatens all commercial and humanitarian traffic in Darfur”. As a result of these activities, on 26 May, the Government informed the African Union that it intended to clear bandits from the Tawilla-kebkabiya road in North Darfur if the attacks did not stop. It should also be noted that the UN or AMIS have

often chosen not to identify rebel forces with acts of banditry they have committed.

In May Libya hosted a six-way African heads-of-state summit on Darfur; it was also attended by the Arab League. The rebel movements refused to attend.

In early June 2005, the African Union announced that Khartoum has stopped military flights over Darfur and shown restraint in clashes with rebels in the past few months. Government troops have also withdrawn from areas they occupied during a December offensive and handed over the AU". The Un Special Envoy to Sudan observed that: "It's over now...there's no reason anymore to fight, (the rebels) don't have any reason anymore not to negotiate.

- **Abuja Fifth Round of Talks**

- * **The Adoption of the Declaration of Principles**

The fifth round of AU-led Darfur Peace Talks opened in Abuja on 10 June 2005, and ended in early July. The UN reported that there were considerable difficulties with regard to important procedural matters, including the roles to be played by Chad and Eritrea. The rebels restated their objections to Chadian mediation in the peace process, claiming that Chad was seeking to prolong the war. The Chadian foreign minister, Nagoum Yamassoum, challenged rebel assertions: "The rebels create problems with Chad – what interest do we have in creating problems that prolong the conflict or the presence of refugees in Chad which costs money, adds security risk, damages the environment?" The Chadian foreign minister went on to state: "[the rebels] say they don't want us because we say the truth which is that the rebel political leaders do not want peace. The people who live in Amsterdam, London, Paris...who are in these five-star palaces, who have not even seen Darfur since 5-6 months, and for whom the Darfur, the war, has given some authority, they are received by heads of state – they do not really want that to stop". He also observed of the leaders "they are contesting with each other – who are the real leaders? No one knows who they are and that's been the main difficulty with the conflict here since the beginning. There is no real leadership for these rebels".

The UN Secretary-general also noted: "There were also sharp differences within and between the two movements. In the case of JEM, breakaway groups called into question the legitimacy of its representatives in Abuja". Nevertheless, these talks concluded with the signing of a

Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur which the African Union envisaged as paving the way for substantive discussion on the key issues of power and wealth sharing. The Declaration of Principles addressed issues such as power – and wealth-sharing, unity, religion, land use and ownership, security arrangements and principles governing Darfur-Darfur Dialogue. The next round of peace talks was scheduled to be held in late August. On 18 July, JEM and the SLA signed an agreement in Libya which sought to unify the rebels' positions on key issues. The August peace talks were called off by the rebels, something criticized by the Sudanese government.

The UN's July 2005 report noted that "violence in Darfur has diminished greatly since the period from early 2003 to mid-2004, which as prior to Security Council decisions and the deployment of AMIS. There can be little doubt that the situation in Darfur is less dangerous for civilians than it was a year ago. Attacks on civilians have declined significantly over the past 12 months, and humanitarian relief workers have access to far more people in need than they had at the time the joint communiqué was signed, in July 2004. these developments should be welcomed by the international community".

This was all to change in the last week of July. On 23 July 2005, the SLA attacked two convoys that were being escorted by government forces on the Nyala-al Fashir road. The government responded by action against SLA in the same area. The United Nations also noted in the Secretary-General's report on 11 August stated that there had been "a considerable rise in abductions, harassment, extortion and looting by both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) victimizing civilians and jeopardizing humanitarian activities". The Secretary-General spoke of a "descent into lawlessness by the armed movements".

While there may not have been many direct attacks on government units, the Darfur rebels stepped up attacks on humanitarian convoys and African Union forces. The United Nations also noted in the Secretary-General's report on 11 August that there had been "a considerable rise in abductions, harassment, extortion and looting by both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SLM/A, in particular South Darfur.". The UN noted that the SLA was refusing to assist AMIS with its enquiries.

On 9 September 2-5, the Joint Commission monitoring the ceasefire condemned rebel involvement in repeated attacks on civilians, aid workers

and AMIS peacekeepers. The United Nations warned that Darfur risked sliding into a perpetual state of lawlessness because of banditry and continuous attacks by armed groups on aid workers, Arab nomads and villages. The UN noted that there had been at least ten serious attacks on humanitarian workers since mid-August.

- **Abuja 6th Round of Talks :-**

It was against this backdrop that the sixth round of inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur was held in Abuja from 25 September – 20 October 2005. The UN noted that “the talks opened with an air of uncertainty regarding the cohesion of the SLM/A delegation and the degree to which the faction of SLM/A Secretary-General Mini Arkoy Minawi was participating”. The UN subsequently noted that “negotiations had not begun by the end of September. Internal divisions within the SLM/A had paralyzed the talks for one week”. The UN Secretary-General publicly urged the leaders of the rebel movements “to definitively choose the road of peace and negotiations rather than that of combat, and to demonstrate a serious interest in substantive peace talks rather than in internal, and selfish, debates”.

A few days into these negotiations, on 20 September 2005, the Sudan Liberation Army launched several attacks on government positions in South Darfur, seizing the town of Sheiria. The government accused the rebels of attempting to undermine the Darfur peace process.

On 15 October 2005, the Darfur Ceasefire Commission called on the Darfur rebels to withdraw without delay from the areas of Labado, Ashma, Graidia and Marla in South Darfur. These areas had previously been controlled by the government and had then been handed over to the African Union. Rebel forces had then taken these areas over. The Commission condemned these actions as well as rebel violations of the ceasefire and their attacks on AU forces and relief workers. The Commission also called on the rebels to provide their locations to AMIS in keeping with previous commitments they had made. The AU also noted that “There is a serious division in the rank of the Sudan Liberation Movement as to who should represent the movement in the talks....As long as the problem is not solved, the talks cannot make much progress”.

The sixth round of peace talks ended in an impasse. The end-of-talks communiqué stated that there had been agreement on the issues of human rights and fundamental rights and criteria and guidelines for power sharing,

in addition to some constructive consultations on the issue of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue.

- **Abuja Seventh Round of Talks**

- The Birth of the D.P.A.**

The 7th round of inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the conflict in Darfur was held in Abuja from 29th November 2005 up to the 5th of May 2006. That round was clearly characterized by negotiation between the government on one hand and three rebel Movements, namely : SLA (Abdel Wahid), SLA (Minawi) and JEM on the other hand. However, internal division within each of the three faction and particularly between prominent figures in the armed and political wings was oftenly backtracking the negotiation process. Nevertheless, with the maximum patience on the part of the government and perseverance on the part of AU and International Partners, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was born. But only one faction of the rebel signed it, that is SLA (Minawi) faction.

The Peace Formula that the DPA provides contains the following :-

- 1- Agreement on power sharing
- 2- Agreement on Wealth sharing
- 3- Agreement on Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements.
- 4- Agreement on the convening of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and consultation.
- 5- Agreement on Implementation Mechanisms.
- 6- Agreement that the following documents shall form part of the Agreement (as Annexures) and shall be implemented by the parties in accordance with the relevant provisions in the chapters of the Agreement.
 - a- Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur, of the 8th of April 2004 (Annexure 1).
 - b- Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance of the 8th of April 2004, N'djamena, Chad (Annexure 2).
 - c- Agreement of Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur, of the 28th of May, 2004 (Annexure 3).
 - d- Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the improvement of the

Humanitarian situation in Darfur of the 9th of November 2004 (Annexure 4).

- e- Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in accordance with the N'djamena Agreement (Annexure 5).
- f- Declaration of Principles for the resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur, of the 5th day of July 2005 (Annexure 6).

• **Main Points of Power Sharing Agreement :-**

- 1- General principles for power sharing covering citizenship, religion, separation of powers, federal system, human rights and fundamental freedoms etc.
- 2- Criteria and guidelines for power sharing emphasizing the inclusion of Darfurians at all levels of governance.
- 3- Establishment of a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) that shall serve as the principal instrument for the implementation of the Agreement and as a symbol of reconciliation and unity of the people of Darfur.
- 4- The TDRA shall consist of the following :
 - a- The Senior Assistance to the President.
 - b- The Government of the three Darfur States.
 - c- Heads of the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission.
 - d- Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund.
 - e- Darfur Land Commission.
 - f- Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission.
 - g- Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council.
 - h- others that may be agreed by the Parties.
- 5- Meetings shall be presided over by the Senior Assistant to the President, and in his/her absence, the Governors of the three Darfur States shall preside over the meetings in rotation.
- 6- The permanent status of Darfur shall be determined through a Referendum held simultaneously in the three States of Darfur.
- 7- The reference on the status of Darfur shall be held not later than twelve months after the elections in Darfur, which shall be held simultaneously with the national elections as specified in the INC, and in any case not later than July 2010.

- 8- In the referendum, the following options shall be presented :
 - a- The creation of a Darfur Region composed of the three States.
 - b- Retention of the present three States.
- 9- The National Elections Commission (NEC) shall organize and supervise the referendum on the status of Darfur. The National Election Law shall specify the rules and procedure governing the referendum. The referendum shall be internationally monitored.
- 10- If a majority of votes cast by all Darfurians in the referendum determines that a Region of Darfur should be formed, the TDRA shall form a Constitutional Commission to determine the competencies of the Regional Government of Darfur. The Commission shall present for adoption its proposed constitution to the Assemblies of the three States of Darfur sitting in joint session within three months of the referendum. The President of the Republic of the Sudan shall then take steps to implement the Constitution as adopted by the Assemblies and any other steps required to establish the Region.
- 11- In the event of a majority of votes being cast against the proposal to establish a Region, the structure of three States in Darfur shall be retained and the TDRA shall be dissolved, in which case, the elected government of the three States of Darfur shall assume any remaining function of the TDRA, in their respective states.
- 12- Upon the signing of the Agreement, the President shall appoint a Senior Assistant to the President from a list of nominees provided by the SLM/A and the JEM. The Senior Assistant shall be the fourth ranking member in the Presidency.
- 13- The Senior Assistant shall have powers that will enable him/her influence national policies. To this end, he/she shall be a member of, inter alia, the National Council of Ministers, the National Security Council and the National Planning Council and shall participate in their deliberations and decision-making. In addition, the Senior Assistant shall:
- 14- Before the elections, and with a view to reflecting the need for unity and inclusiveness the GoS shall ensure effective representation for Darfurians, including for the Movement, as follows :-
 - a- The three posts of Cabinet Minister and three posts of State Minister currently held by Darfurians shall continue to be held by Darfurians.

- b- One additional post of Cabinet Minister and two additional posts of State Ministers shall be allocated to nominees of the Movements.
 - c- The chairmanship of one of the Parliamentary Committees of the National Assembly shall be allocated to a nominee of the Movements.
 - d- Special effort shall be made to ensure that women are represented in these nominations.
- 15- Before the elections, and with a view to reflecting the need for unity and inclusiveness the GoS shall ensure the representation of Darfurians in the National Assembly, including the Movement, in this regard not less than a total of 12 seats shall be allocated to nominees of the Movements. It is highly recommended that some of the nominees be women.
- 16- Darfur State representatives in the Council of States shall be eminent persons without direct party political affiliation. The Parties agree on the need for wide consultation among Darfurians on the subject of Darfur States representation in the Council of States, and that this shall be the subject of consultation in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
- 17- Within Darfur the DPA States that :
- a- The Governor of one of the three States of Darfur as well as Deputy Governors of the other two States of Darfur shall be nominees of the Movement.
 - b- Two Ministerial positions and one senior Advisor in each of the three States of Darfur shall be allocated to nominees of the Movement.
 - c- Before the State elections, seats in the legislature of each of the three Darfur States shall be increased to 65. Of these, 18 seats in each state legislature shall be allocated to the nominees of the Movement.
 - d- The Deputy Speakers of the Darfur States' Legislative Assemblies shall be nominees of the Movement.

• **Main Points of Wealth Sharing Agreement :-**

- 1- The Parties agreed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the urgent needs as a matter of top priority through the establishment of a Joint Assembly Mission (JAM) for Darfur. The modalities and timing of the

establishment of such a mission will be worked out as soon as possible and, in any event, as a matter of priority after consultations with all stakeholders. Noting that the financial resources and expertise required for such an exercise are beyond the capacity of the Sudan, the Parties urgently appeal to the International Community to fully participate in this initiative and to assist in providing the requisite resources and expertise and to contribute to meet the needs identified in this process.

2- The Parties agreed that Darfur as a whole, and in particular those areas in need of construction or reconstruction, shall be brought up to the level that will allow them to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) rapidly. A program for development of basic infrastructure shall be formulated to integrate Darfur with the rest of the economy.

3- A special fund for reconstruction and development of Darfur shall be established under this Agreement.

4- Recognition of traditional rights (including "hawakeer") and historical rights in land is essential to establish a secure and sustainable basis for livelihood and development in Darfur. The Agreement sets out the mechanisms for recognizing and protection of those rights.

5- Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts there shall be established a Darfur Land Commission to address issues related to traditional and historical rights to land, and review land use management and natural resource development processes.

6- The GoS is to be committed to contributing resources to meet urgent needs for the return and resettlement of IDPs and refugees.

7- The Parties agreed to establish a Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission (DRRC) to implement strategies to conduct surveys and assessments monitor and report on the situation of the displaced and war-affected persons to the appropriate level of government.. strategies, survey, assessments and information should be shared with the international community.

8- The Parties agreed on the establishment of an independent and impartial Compensation Commission to deal, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of court, with claims for compensation by people of Darfur who have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or human and economic losses, in connection with the conflict.

9- The Commission shall be established by President Decree and shall continue to operate until the final disposition of all claims for compensation.

• **Main Points of Agreement on Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements :**

- 1- Full commitment of the parties to the 2004 N'djamena Agreement on humanitarian ceasefire.
- 2- The final security arrangement shall attempt to :-
 - a- ensure that a ceasefire prevails in Darfur
 - b- ensure that civilians are not subjected to violence intimidation threats and forced displacement.
 - c- ensure that protection of the civilian population is given the highest priority by all parties, particularly the women and children are not subjected to gender-based violence.
 - d- ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided safely to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other civilians in need.
 - e- help create the environment that would enable IDPs and refugees to return voluntarily and safely to their places of origin.
 - f- ensure that the Parties co-operate with AMIS and the other ceasefire monitoring and verification bodies.
- 3- The Comprehensive Cease Arrangement cover the following main areas:-
 - a- Prohibited Activities (Article 25).
 - b- Strengthening the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (Article 26).
 - c- Protection IDPs and Humanitarian Supply Routes (Article 27)
 - d- Disengagement Redeployment and Limited Arms Control (Article 28).
 - e- Non-Military Logistic Supplies to the Movements (Article 29)
- 4- All security arrangements contained in the agreement are to be carried by regional and national implementators. The AU forces represent the regional component while the Government and the

movements forces represent the national component. The DPA categorically ruled out any international element in the implementation of the security arrangements of the Agreement.

- **Main Points of the Agreement on the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and consultation (DDDC):-**

- 1- The DDDC shall be organized pursuant to the Declaration of Principles of 5 July 2005. The DoP reads: "Agreements reached by the Parties shall be presented to the people of Darfur to secure their support through Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation".
- 2- The DDDC shall serve as a mechanism for mobilizing support for this Agreement and implementing it, by :
 - a- Publicizing this Agreement and not to reopen it for further negotiation:
 - b- Deepening this Agreement by addressing challenges of local pace and reconciliation issues.
 - c- Discussing and building consensus on the main outstanding issues concerning the citizens of Darfur regarding the causes of conflict, insecurity, restoration of social fabric and a common future for all;
 - d- Providing a forum for the Parties jointly address their responsibilities in implementing their commitments to this Agreements: and
 - e- Brining other stakeholders into the Darfur peace process with special consideration for active and visible participation by women and the youth.
- 3- The DDDC shall seek to mobilize support for this Agreement and to secure mechanisms for implementing it among the people of Darfur through providing ownership of this Agreement.
- 4- The Parties underscore that the DDDC is an integral part of the Abuja peace process. The Parties shall accord the DDDC due respect by ensuring its autonomy, they shall resist from using it as a means for pursuing short-tem political gains for political expediency. The Parties shall ensure that the DDDC is organized in a manner that preserves its integrity.
- 5- The DDDC shall serve as a consultative mechanism. Its decision-making powers shall be limited to specific areas laid down in the

- Agreement. It shall consult and advise on a range of other issues not addressed in the Agreement, seeking consensus among stakeholders.
- 6- The DDDC shall seek to be truly representative of all Darfurians irrespective of their political affiliation and thereby enjoy moral and political authority.
 - 7- The mandate of the DDDC is derived from the Declaration of Principles of 5 July 2005. It is also in conformity with the spirit of the CPA of 9 January 2005.
 - 8- Within 30 days of the signing of this Agreement, the African Union, in consultation with the Parties, shall establish a Preparatory Committee for the DDDC.
 - 9- The Preparatory Committee shall not exceed 25 members. It shall consist of representative of GoS, the SLM/A and the JEM, and representative of civil society.
 - 10- The DDDC shall focus upon two areas, namely (1) political and (2) socio-economic and traditional. The DDDC shall have an organizing theme, "Building Peace Reconciliation in Darfur".
 - 11- The main function of the DDDC shall be to popularize the Agreement and obtain support for it from all stakeholders in Darfur. This shall include discussing, understanding and disseminating the various component parts of the Agreement.

IV- Problems and Difficulties Encountered During the Negotiation Process

1- Divisions within the Movements :-

There was clearly a number of serious problems with regard to the rebel movements and peace in Darfur – problems which explain both the inability of the rebel movements to negotiate within the peace process and the slide into banditry by groups.

It was widely recognized that the Sudan Liberation Army was increasingly disorganized and has been caught up in ethnic and personality conflicts. To an extent that was predictable. A number of observers noted that the movement emerged into the political arena as a marriage of convenience rather than of conviction – a coming together of tribally organized armed groups on the basis of what united them, with very little discussion of what divided them.

One of the most apparent divisions within the SLA has been a tribal one, combatants led by Minni Minawi. Leadership within the SLA has continued to be polarized between Abd al-Wahid and Minni Minawi, and their respective tribal constituencies. Minawi and his largely Zaghawa fighters started to push for control of the SLA that continued to be resisted by Abdel Wahid and his Fur constituency.

Another deep division has been between the SLA's external and internal components. Both Minawi and Abd al-Wahid left Darfur in 2004. Once outside Darfur, both began to lose touch with SLA commanders in the field. An additional division that emerged within the SLA was that of age. A generation of young gunmen had emerged as SLA commanders. They were young and inexperienced and leave no openings for intellectuals or men of experience. Leaving JEM's political agenda to one side, even that of the Sudan Liberation Army is far from coherent. During negotiations Movements ultimate goals remained murky. Over the years, its leaders have advocated everything from secession to greater representation in local government to the capitulation of the central government". They failed to clarify their political objectives or presented them in a coherent way. The implications of this incoherence have been spelled out in October 2004 by the New York Times: "The rebels' political goals have never been clear, beyond vague demands for the sharing of wealth and power in Sudan. That is a major stumbling block in the peace talks".

2- Inter-Rebel Conflicts :-

It was also clear that there were deep political differences and tensions between JEM and the SLA. As early as May 2004, the International Crisis Group quoted a leading SLA member as saying: "Continued coordination with JEM is unclear, because they (JEM) have some ambiguous political backing". In October 2004, Reuters reported: "The rebel movements negotiating with Sudan's government to try to end the 20-month-old conflict in Darfur have been unable to come up with a common political framework and they presented separate documents to mediators instead". The New York Times has noted that the issue of the separation of religion and state had been cited as a major area of divergence between the two groups.

3- Further Splintering of Rebel Groups :-

Inter-Rebel Conflicts encouraged the emergence of further armed groups in Darfur. A number of new groups, of varying credibility, had

appeared on the scene. The African Union recognized only the SLA and, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the National Movement for Reform and Development, which split from JEM and agreed to respect a ceasefire after talks with Khartoum. Major-General Festus Okonkwo, the Nigerian Commander of AU in Darfur, on the issue of new groups was quoted saying that: “If we recognize too many groups, then more groups will take up arms. So the AU will not recognize any more groups”.

4- Lack of Negotiation’s Experience :-

The SLA and JEM negotiating teams were catapulted into major negotiations with almost no experience or preparation. Lacking political structures of strategy, the Movements compensated for lack of quality with quantity and sent ever-larger numbers to the talks. Most of its delegates were poorly prepared at best, but still insisted on being party to every discussion. Without a negotiating strategy...talks did not get beyond acrimonious preliminaries. In the AU’s conference chambers, Movement delegates rage at the government, but rarely articulated a political agenda.

5- Foreign Involvement in Darfur :-

There was another difficulty which has posed a problem in the search for peace in Darfur – those foreign governments and constituencies who, for their own political interest, would wish to see continuing conflict in Darfur and the continued destabilization of Sudan in Darfur and elsewhere .

The UN Special Envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk has clearly pointed to the fact that some foreign governments have encountered the Darfur rebels – and, if these same foreign interests now want peace in Darfur, they will now have to put pressure on them to negotiate a peaceful settlement: “Some people have been told: “ ‘If you fight, you get some outside support’. But the same countries who made such risky statements will have to tell these people in the field” ‘If you fight, you won’t get any support any more from us; you have to participate in the political dialogue’.

6- Wrong Signals from some Western Capitals :-

The negotiation process had seen a number of wrong signals originating from some major Western Capitals that tended to back track the negotiations and mislead the Movements negotiators.

7- Questionable Sources, Questionable Reports :-

There is little doubt that some Human Right groups in Darfur have once again relied upon questionable sources with regard to the human rights situation in Darfur. It has also been clear that in some cases their analysts are partisan and their methodology with regard to Sudan has been flawed. This was in the face of the rebel commander's direct and indirect responsibility for massive human rights violations including the murder, rape or torture of hundreds if not thousands of civilians, many of whom were women and children. Unsurprisingly, many of Human Rights groups reports on Darfur were marked by their deliberate lack of focus on rebel's human rights abuses.

8- International Misconception of the Conflict in Darfur :-

One of the major obstacles to peaceful settlement in Darfur was the International perceptions of the conflict in Darfur which continued to be distorted by the sort of propaganda claims that go hand in hand with all wars and particularly civil wars. Those claims were too often echoed by provocative and sensationalist media. Unrealistic international demands that used to reach the negotiation rooms, and oftenly fueled by superficial press coverage of the war, could only result in the hardening of positions and negotiations setbacks.

9- Misrepresentation of the CPA :-

The comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army on January 9, 2005 was agreed be seen as a significant step towards finding a just peaceful and lasting solution to all the conflicts in the Sudan. This was oftenly misrepresented by the Movements in the sense that CPA measures on power sharing or wealth sharing or security arrangements should be applied to the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. That was unrealistic because neither the history of relations between the Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan is similar to that between Darfur and the other parts of the North, nor that the measure of the right of self-determination granted to the people of Southern Sudan could apply to Darfur and its citizens.

V- Lessons Learnt

The long process of negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Movements, namely the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which started in Abeche in September 17th, 2003 and ended in Abuja in 5th May 2006 has offered a number of serious lessons to be learnt. Major among them are the following :

1- Regardless of the sensationalism and propaganda that surrounded the reporting of the conflict in Darfur, the reality is that when the parties to the conflict met in Abuja and reasonably and objectively diagnosed the root causes of the conflict they voluntarily came to the conclusion that the core of the conflict in Darfur is political and socio-economic and can only be resolved through peaceful means and within the framework of a comprehensive settlement that addresses its various causes and aspects (D.O.P.)

2- Regardless of the misinformation that characterized the coverage of the rebels demands regarding the final status of Darfur, the parties to the conflict without exception reaffirmed their commitment to the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Sudan.

3- The African Union has successfully brokered the peace talks that ended with the signing of the DPA that objectively established a sound framework of conflict resolution based on fair power and wealth sharing and sound security arrangements. The presence of military observers from the African Union, the guarantor of the Agreement is an essential part of the implementation of the Agreement. The United Nations, since the beginning, supported this involvement and the European Union played a key role in facilitating African Union presence and role in Darfur. It is therefore evident that any change of position by either UN or EU or both can only result in the death of the Agreement.

4- Anti Sudanese government campaigns must be adequately measured and properly focused. Knee-jerk responses by some Western countries and other sections of the International Community to sensationalist and often questionable claims about Darfur serve only to enflame an already tense situation. They can also endanger the north-south peace process and have the potential of slowing Sudan's re-engagement with the West as well as adversely colouring the image of the West within the developing world.

VI- The Way Forward

With the signing of the DPA in Abuja, the road to peace and stability in Darfur has now become very clear. As has been explained, the DPA contains a very comprehensive and very detailed peace framework. At face value, with the DPA a political solution to the Darfur conflict should not be difficult. The government is fully committed to the implementation of the DPA. The government objectives are: to end the fighting in Darfur, stabilize Darfur for humanitarian aid access, re-establish the rule of law in Darfur and where possible identify and pursue those people guilty of war crimes, disarming the armed banditry who came to be known as the “Janjaweed”, assist those communities that have been displaced to return to their homes, rebuild and develop Darfur infrastructure. The government shall be fully committed to the power and wealth sharing arrangements contained in the D.P.A. and the implementation schedules agreed upon.

In the area of security, the ceasefire arrangements and the separation of forces they envisage shall be respected, enforced and minored. The mission of the African Union monitors should be supported and assisted and where necessary enhanced.

It is therefore essential that the full implementation of the DPA must be encouraged and all parties to the conflict must be held to account by the International Community. Obstructionists to the implementation of the DPA must be penalized by the International Community and external involvement with or support for DPA rejectionists must stop. Criminality in Darfur must be dealt with aggressively and perpetrators of armed banditry that undermines law and order in Darfur should not escape justice. Only concerted international pressure can make this happen and create the conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the DPA.

- **DPA Implementation Progress :-**

Immediately following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) the Government set for itself as a strategic goal the full and effective implementation of this agreement which covers questions of power sharing, wealth sharing, comprehensive ceasefire and final Security arrangements in addition to the Darfur/Darfur dialogue and consultation, with a view to normalize the situation in Darfur in a comprehensive manner during the second half of this year 2006 and continue the maintenance and consolidation of peace in Darfur.

Accordingly the Government proceeded immediately following the signature of the agreement to set up a whole apparatus for follow-up and implementation. This included :-

- 1- The high level Darfur committee chaired by the President
- 2- The Darfur Executive Task force chaired by the Minister for the Presidency of the Republic.
- 3- Darfur Peace Agreement implementation Operation Room chaired by the Advisor to the President.
- 4- The Darfur mechanism :
 - a- Committee Chaired by the Wali (Governor) or the Deputy to the chairperson of the Darfur Transitional Regional Authority.
 - b- Branch committees in each of the Darfur States.
- 5- The National Unity Government Committee work in partnership and co-ordination with the official bodies and mechanism created by the (DPA).

- **Strategic Objective :-**

The Strategic objectives is the full implementation of the DPA in the areas of power sharing, wealth sharing including the return of the IDPs to their places of origin and the associated rehabilitation needs for the displaced, comprehensive and total ceasefire and final security arrangements. The convening of the Darufr-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation conference is of utmost importance and hoped to lead to restoration of the social fabric and bring about consensus and peaceful coexistence of people of Darfur.

THE DPA IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE

Implementation Mechanisms:

Since the signing of the DPA the GONU took concrete steps towards creating an enabling environment for its full implementation .In this regard specific implementation mechanisms were established at the national and state levels as follows:

1. The Darfur High Commission chaired by the President of the Republic.
2. The Executive Committee branching from the high committee and chaired by the Vice President.
- 3The DPA Implementation Committee headed by the First Assistant to the President which is in turn divided into eight sub –committees covering the different areas of the implementation process.
- 4 The DPA implementation Operations Room which groups all the government departments and institutions concerned with the implementation process, headed by the adviser to the president.

5 The Joint Implementation mechanisms which group representatives of the GONU and the signatory movements plus the AU Implementation Team based in Khartoum. These include:

1. The Steering Committee, made up of the government, the leaders of the signatory movements and the head of the AU implementation team.
2. The Management committee
3. The joint power sharing committee
4. The joint wealth sharing committee
5. The joint security arrangements committee
6. The joint legal committee
7. The joint media committee

8. The DDDC preparatory committee headed by a representative of the AU.

Popularization of the DPA.:

Parallel to the official implementation efforts, the government undertook to popularize the DPA by printing and distributing several thousand copies of it. Also a number of mass meetings and workshops were organized for the same purpose. At the same time an important effort was undertaken by the Sudanese diplomatic missions abroad to create awareness about the DPA at the regional and international levels

MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NON –SIGNATOTIES:-

As a reflection of its strong commitment to the success of the DPA and the peace effort in Darfur the government continued its meetings and consultations with the those who were unable to sign the agreement. as a result some of the rebel groups and leaders chose to join the peace ; The Free Will faction of SLM joined the process by signing what came to be known as the declaration of commitment (DOC) to the DPA .Another group of the SLM led by Ibrahim Madibbo, the Peace Wing of JEM and SLM Mother Organization led by Abul Gasim Imam all joined the peace by accepting the DPA .

There are now other indications after the recent JEM conference held in Addis Abeba that the momentum for peace in that movement is gaining ground. Other encouraging signs also point out that several field commanders are now inclined to join the peace.

For its part the government remains fully committed to its strategic objective of realizing peace and stability all over Darfur.

GENARAL AMNISTY:-

The President of the republic issued a presidential decree granting amnesty to all those who have been have been in detention in relation to the situation in Darfur. This was coupled with presidential pardon and release from prison of

all Darfurians who have been convicted and sentenced in a recent coup attempt .

RATIFICATION OF THE DPA :-

Both the National Assembly and the Council of States ratified the DPA thus giving it full constitutional and legal status

AMMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The Darfur States constitutions were amended to guarantee compatibility between them and the DPA.

PRESIDENTAIL DECREES AND DESCISIONS ISSUED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DPA :-

The following presidential decrees and decisions were issued in implementation of the DPA :

1. PD N0 15/2006 on the appointment of Senior Assistant to President and Chairperson of the TDRA .
2. PD N0 18/2006 on the creation of the TDRA
3. PD N0 19/2006 establishing the Compensation Commission in Darfur .
4. PDN0 20/2006 establishing the Compensation Fund in Darfur .
5. PD N0 21 establishing the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission Darfur.
6. PDn0 22 establishing the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund.
7. PD n023 /2006 establishing the specialized border commission
8. PD n0 27/2006 amending PD N0 18/2006 to state that the TDRA shall act as main instrument for implementation of the DPA the promotion of co-ordination and cooperation between the three Darfur states
9. PD N0 28/2006 amending article (2) 2 of.....to mention that the board of the fund shall be responsible to the senior assistant to the President
10. PD N029 on the h.q of the rehabilitation and resettlement commission
- 11 .PD N0 30/2006 regarding the responsibility of the assistant to the President for the performance of the Darfur reconstruction and development fund.
- 12 PD N031/2006 regarding the secretariat of the borders commission.
- 13 PD N032/2006 amending PD N034 /2001 by adding the senior assistant to the President to the membership of the National Council for Srategic Planning.
14. PD N0 114/2006 granting amnesty to members of the armed Darfur movements which have signed the DPA.
15. PD N0 120 /2006 referring the DPA to the National Legislature.

16 PD N0 172/2006 adding the assistant to the President to the membership of the High Committee for the implementation of the DPA.

17 PD N0180 /2006 regarding the membership of the sub committees of the High committee for the implementation of the DPA .

18. PD N0233/2006 conceting the remaining period of jail sentences for convicted prisoners from Darfur.

19. presidential decision exempting Darfur students from higher education fees.

20. presidential decision appointing state minister (Mustapha Terab) in ministry of Federal chamber

21. Appointment of minister in the government of the state of Khartoum.

IMPLEMENTATION IN THE AREA OF POWER SHARING :-

APPOINTMENTS TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND EXECUTIVE POSTS:-

1. Senior Assistant to President.
2. Two State ministers in federal council of ministers.
3. Minister in Khartoum state.
4. Appointment of (12) members in the National Assembly form the movements.
5. Chairman of Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development.
6. Darfur Land commission.
7. Appointment of the chairman of the Rehabilitation Reconstruction Fund.
8. The allocation of the post of the governor (Wali) of West Darfur to the movements and the appointment of a representative of the movements to this post.
9. The Governors of the three states of Darfur have made public appointments of representative of the movements in the legislative and executive branches as required by the DPA.

EDUCATION

In the area of education implementation covered the following areas:

1. Darfur students have been exempted from tuition fees for five years.
2. Special measures have been taken to enable Darfur students to apply to the 50% of seats reserved for them in admission to the Darfur universities and the 15% of the admission chances in the national universities in Khartoum. For this purpose their was a special extension of the admissions period to universities for the benefit of Darfur students . In addition there was a 12% lowering of admission requirements for Darfur students. So far more than five thousand Darfur students have applied.

CIVIL SERVICE:-

Discussions are now under way between the parties with the assistance of the government departments concerned with a view to lay down the best ways to implement the stipulations.

THE BORDRES COMMISSION:-

The Borders Commission is presently carrying out its mission in accordance with the DPA and is expected to be able to submit its report soon.

IN THE AREA OF WEALTH SHARING

Action in the area of wealth sharing started with the formation of the needs assessment mission and the Core coordination Group (CCG) which held its first meeting in the Netherlands in June 2006 .This was followed by a number of steps including the convening of the Darfur needs assessment workshop on June 30 ,2006 . Consequently needs assessment teams were able to visit around 20 sites for the needs assessment purposes. The data collected is now being processed in preparation of the report and recommendations.

IN THE AREA OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

In coordination with African Union the date of June 1 was considered the starting date for the commencement of the implementation of security arrangements following the successive extension periods granted by the African Union for the non –signatories .This was followed by the following steps and measures :

1. Orders were issued to the western command for the cessation of hostilities with the movement.
2. The following committees were formed in may2005 for implementation of security arrangements:
 - a. High committee headed by the minister for national defense.
 - b.Executive committee headed by the chairman of the joint operations staff.
3. Military observers representing the government were seconded to the CFC to meet the new requirements of the DPA in May 2005.
4. The plan for the police tasks in the buffer zones and the demilitarized zones as well as the IDP camps was prepared in June 2006.
5. The committees required to accompany the sites determination teams in the three states of Darfur were appointed in May 2006.

- 6 The janjaweed /armed militias disarmament plan prepared and submitted to representative of the AU on July 6, 2006.
7. Redeployment plan of the western command covering the various stages in accordance with DPA submitted to the CFC.
8. Plan for withdrawal of SAF from areas that are to form buffer zones prepared.
9. A joint task force has been formed in coordination with the movements for the implementation of the agreement .The required facilities and resources have been made available for this group.
10. The actual start of disarmament of the janjaweed /armed militias in the area of Kass in south Darfur on June 23. 2006
11. A joint group of representatives of SAF and the movements has been formed for the implementation of the DPA provisions regarding the integration of elements of the movements into the armed forces and the security organs PLAN for former combatants reintegration prepared. Preparation for.
12. A further step on the way on the way to neutralize the janjaweed /armed militias was realized by the opening of the offices of the national commission for DDR in Genuine on July 8, 2006.
13. Security organs reform commission constituted on 15 July 2006.
14. DDR plan prepared 1 September 2006.
15. Preparation for formation of community police started.
16. Redeployment of heavy weapons.

- Regarding non logistic supplies to the DPA signatory movements (non military supplies), several meetings have taken place between the governments security committee and the movements which led to agreement on the following:
 - a .preparation of map for humanitarian supply routes.
 - b. qaurantee of security of humanitarian supply routes .
 - c. determining priorities for areas to receive international **humanitarian assistance.**
 - d. Coordination with security committees at state level as well as **with western command.**
 - E .formation of branch committees under the supervision of state security committees for implementation of humanitarian relief programmes .
 - f. coordination with AMIS ,the CFC and representatives of the **movements .**
 - g. providing information to media .
 - h. field missions to supervise implementation of programmers .
 - I. contribution to normalization of civilian life

It is worth mentioning here that despite the fact that the DPA does not put the government under the obligation to provide the movements with these supplies and puts this obligation on the shoulders of the AU and the international

community, the government, out of patriotic sentiment and to promote confidence building chose to provide non military supplies to the elements of the movements in their camps and to contribute effectively to the humanitarian effort. A special task force known as the supply committee has been formed. Details of what has been done by the government in this area appear below (annex).

THE JOINT HUMANITARIAN FACILITATION AND MONITERING UNIT:-

The government submitted a request to the AU and the international community to expedite the formation of this unit and enable it to start carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the DPA . This is being followed up.

THE ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVMENTS OF THE DDR COMMISSION:

This commission carried out several activities within its mandate regarding the information and awareness raising about its activities in the Northern Sudan in the area of DDR . The achievements to date have been important and they included the opening of three offices in the three Darfur states and the creation of partnerships with several parties with aview to expediting work on the commissions, programs in Darfur . Prominent among those partnerships is the one that has been started with the council of the Darfur elders as part of an effort aiming at binging all the political forces in Darfur to support the peace effort, and with a view to broaden the peace partnership and to create ever more favorable conditions for the success of the commission. The partnerships also include academic and intellectual ones. This is in addition to the role of the commission in targeting the masses through media programs to inform them and raise their awareness about the DPA .In another area special programs have been prepared for the reintegration of child soldiers in coordination with the SLM/A and the NNGOs . In this area the commission organized workshops and training cession **on DDR and the propagation of the culture of peace in cooperation with civil society organizations and native administration.**

The commission's action no doubt contributes a great deal to the cause of peace in Darfur and is fully supported by the government.

THE DARFUR /DARFUR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATION:-

The preparatory committee headed by the AU and including representatives of the government, the movements, native administration, IDPs, Civil society and the international community, has been formed and is expected to start its work soon .

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF TH DPA :

- a. Discernments against the 2006 general budget covering the expenses incurred under the DPA have been effected.
- b. Allotments for the development and reconstruction fund and the compensation fund are now includes in the 2007 general budget.